Leaders and followers: European pre-understanding and prejudice in the Greek financial crisis by Haran, Francis
This file was downloaded from BI Brage,  
the institutional repository (open access) at BI Norwegian Business School 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi 
 
 
 
 
 
Leaders and followers: European pre-understanding and prejudice in the 
Greek financial crisis 
 
Francis Haran 
BI Norwegian Business School  
 
 
The article is published in  
 
Journal of Intercultural Communication, 37(2015) 
 
 
 
This is an open access journal available at http://immi.se/intercultural. Articles can be 
deposited in the institutional repository provided its original source is cited clearly. 
  
1 
 
Leaders and Followers: European Pre-understanding and 
Prejudice in the Greek Financial Crisis 
 
The secret of success is to understand the point of view 
of others. 
—A quote from Henry Ford displayed in the office of the 
German Deputy Minister of Finance Jörg Asmussen (In Lewis 
2011:139). 
 
Abstract 
Drawing upon the principles of hermeneutics, Intercultural Communication 
analysts maintain that in meetings between cultures, understanding requires pre-
understanding. Hans-Georg Gadamer, a central figure in modern hermeneutics, 
points out moreover that in the movement toward understanding it may be 
necessary to provoke an unnoticed prejudice. For as long as our mind is 
influenced by a prejudice, Gadamer explains, we do not consider it a judgment. 
This article, through an examination of variations in leadership expectations, 
attempts to provoke the unnoticed western prejudice that is preventing an 
effective European pre-understanding of Modern Greece. This prejudice, 
operating unseen by the West, first produced the Greek financial crisis and now 
threatens to drive Greece away from taking its rightful place in the European 
family of nations. 
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Prologue: English Gold 
In 1824, when the Greeks were three years into their War of Independence 
against the Ottoman Empire, quite unexpectedly ships carrying consignments of 
English gold began to arrive in the port where the provisional Greek government 
had made its base. The gold, in the form of gold sovereigns and Spanish dollars, 
was the proceeds from a huge loan raised on the London Stock Exchange in 
support of the Greek cause. For cashed-up financiers in England seeking a safe 
haven for their accumulated capital, the most attractive investment was in 
foreign bonds, which were government guaranteed if anything should go wrong. 
The loan of £900,000, almost ten times the annual tax revenues of the 
beleaguered provisional government, was wealth beyond even the wildest 
dreams of the incredulous Greeks.  
William St Clair (2008:230) writes that what followed was not merely 
corruption but rather a kind of “financial anarchy”. Revolutionary chieftains and 
militia captains from all over the country arrived to demand their share of the 
money and indeed soon Greeks with any pretention to military status at all were 
on the government payroll. In an ostentatious display of conspicuous 
consumption members of militia bands squandered their new-found wealth on 
3 
 
high-end luxury items such as gold-embroidered jackets and silver-mounted 
pistols, the kind of richly ornamented finery favored by the military classes in 
Turkey. Hundreds of thousands of pounds were frittered away by the 
government in an ill-conceived attempt to build a navy, a project which resulted 
in every rotting hulk in Greece being hastily fitted out to qualify for regular 
instalments of English gold. Even so, despite the generous disbursement of such 
largesse from the public purse, observers at the time expressed surprise that so 
few of the gold coins were to be found in general circulation. For, as is often the 
case when large amounts of hard currency are suddenly introduced into a 
backward economy, much of the gold immediately fell into the hands of the 
wealthiest members of the community who promptly deposited the money in 
foreign bank accounts, while the common soldiery hoarded the coins, often 
sewing them into their belts, from where they became a welcome surprise for the 
enemy when the Greek corpses were stripped on the battlefield. 
When the government inevitably defaulted on its loan repayments, in 
reprisal Greece was excluded from European stock exchanges and cut off from 
foreign credit and capital, a crippling financial sanction that forced the 
government to impose punitive austerity measures, the effects of which 
seriously retarded the prospects of economic recovery for decades to come. 
 
Aims and Methodology  
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The specific and more immediate aim of this study is to identify, through an 
analysis of variations in leadership expectations, the locus of accountability for 
the Greek financial crisis. My methodological approach is historical and sets out 
from the premise that markedly different histories (experience) can result in 
markedly different cultures (values, beliefs, assumptions and expectations).1 
Through an examination of the history of Modern Greece I propose to 
demonstrate that when European leaders allowed Greece into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1981, they unknowingly introduced into their 
midst a markedly different culture, a people who had not experienced the 
centuries of Europe’s Western Tradition and toward whom European leaders 
could not instinctively apply their customary Western European expectations. 
For, unknown to most Western European observers, the road that Greece has 
travelled to reunite with its European origins is quite different from the road 
experienced by its fellow European nations. 
My study centers upon the Intercultural Communication variable of 
leadership style (Chhokar et al. 2007, Yukl 2013) and focuses in particular on 
variations in leadership expectations. 
The first step toward achieving the above specific aim is the 
foregrounding of an unnoticed prejudice that uniquely disadvantages Greece as a 
European Union (EU) member state. In their research into the communication 
process, Intercultural Communication analysts have recently introduced the 
concept adapted from hermeneutics that “understanding requires pre-
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understanding” (Allwood 1985). Jens Allwood writes that in order to put 
perceived information into a meaningful context, one must already be in 
possession of certain stored information (1985:8). That is to say, only when one 
has “filled in” the delimiting gaps in one’s understanding, is one in a position to 
understand.  
The term pre-understanding derives from the German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s concept of fore-meaning (Dahl 2004:28), which in turn 
connects with two other key terms for this study, expectations and prejudices 
(Gadamer 2004:268-306). Gadamer states that according to the principles of 
hermeneutics, understanding moves constantly from the whole to the part and 
back to the whole (2004:291). This movement moreover, he explains, involves 
the anticipation of meaning.  
 
The anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes 
actual understanding when the parts that are determined by the whole 
themselves also determine this whole. (2004:291) 
 
The movement toward the understanding of a certain subject matter, that is to 
say, involves an expectation of meaning that follows from the context of what 
has gone before. Gadamer writes:  
 
6 
 
It is of course necessary for this expectation to be adjusted if the text (the 
subject matter) calls for it. This means, then, that the expectation changes 
and that the text unifies its meaning around another expectation. 
(Gadamer 2004:291) 
 
In the movement toward understanding, in other words, expectations previously 
based on imperfect (not yet “filled-in”) fore-meanings accordingly adjust to 
reflect more unified understanding.  
Gadamer also points out that our fore-meanings may contain prejudices 
that can hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding (295). 
 
Foregrounding a prejudice clearly requires suspending its validity for us. 
For as long as our mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not consider it 
a judgment. How then can we foreground it? It is impossible to make 
ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, 
but only when it is, so to speak, provoked. (Gadamer 2004:298)   
       
The broader theoretical aim, then, of this study is to provoke an unnoticed 
prejudice and to necessitate the adjustment of expectations resting on imperfect 
fore-meanings (pre-understanding).  
 
Introduction  
7 
 
For western civilization Greece presents a unique case, for Greece alone 
possesses the ancient heritage of Classical Greece. For Western Europe, this 
uniqueness has produced an unnoticed historical prejudice in its pre-
understanding of Modern Greece that has hindered understanding and led to 
misunderstanding.  
In the early Christian tradition of the Roman Empire, the Greek East and 
the Latin West were once one. But with the fall of the western empire, while the 
Greek East continued unchanged along the traditional road of Orthodoxy in the 
East Roman Empire, the European West began developing in its own separate 
direction. Through the Renaissance for example it acquired its unshakeable 
identification with the ideal of Classical Greece, while through the 
Enlightenment it turned from the revealed certainties of religion to embrace the 
bold new certainties of science. And as Europeans grew confident in their 
emerging western identity they became increasingly indifferent to the fortunes 
of their erstwhile co-religionists in the East. They detached themselves from 
what Gadamer refers to as the “unbroken stream of tradition” (2004:295). And 
with the passing of the centuries, as the classical ideal of Ancient Greece 
hardened into an inalienable component of European identity, the Orthodox 
tradition in the East, a tradition to which the West had originally belonged, sank 
into oblivion. With the Greek War of Independence in 1821, therefore, when 
Greece reappeared on the European stage after an absence of two millennia, 
Western European states turned naturally to their Enlightenment prejudices and 
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to Ancient Greece for their pre-understanding of Modern Greece. Similarly, 
Western Europeans today (unable to put perceived information into a 
meaningful context) base their expectations of the Modern Greeks on the 
imperfect pre-understanding that Greece is a western culture just like their own.  
 
Background 
For Europeans imbued with the ideals of philhellenism that were sweeping 
Europe in the early nineteenth century, the emergence of Greece from 400 years 
of Ottoman rule represented the liberation of the subjugated Modern Greeks and 
the regeneration of the heroic Ancient Greeks. According to St Clair, most 
Europeans came to assume that the Ancient and the Modern Greeks were the 
same without bothering unduly about the implications of the assumption (16). 
This unexamined pre-understanding stemmed from the fact that in the centuries 
since the Renaissance and the rediscovery of classical learning, the label 
“Greece” became exclusively associated in the European mind with Ancient 
Greece and the classical pinnacle of excellence that Europeans had come so 
much to admire.2 Moreover, as a grounding in the classics became de rigueur in 
the formal background of the governing classes in Europe, the Golden Age of 
Greece came to represent the ideal that lay at the very heart of western 
civilization (Holden 1972:46). After the upheavals of the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the Ancient Greek ideal had become the model 
to which liberal western leaders aspired. Indeed, in the liberal ideal to establish a 
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politically stable family of nation states in Europe, Greece’s “branding value” 
was such that the inclusion of Greece became a promotional imperative. St Clair 
writes that by the time of the Greek War of Independence, enthusiasm for 
Greece in Europe had risen to the pitch of a political force. 
  
It was linked with the ideas of political liberty and national independence, 
which were spread widely over Europe by the wars of the French 
Republic and Empire. The leaders of the movements that regarded 
themselves as representing all that was most humane and progressive 
claimed Ancient Greece as their model and their guide. (2008:15) 
 
However, the Renaissance and the French Revolution were western events 
that signally did not take place in the Ottoman Empire. It was only those Greeks 
who were exposed to western culture, therefore, who were in a position to learn 
about their ancient past or embrace the western liberal ideals that led to the 
launching of the Greek Revolution.3 The vast majority of the Greeks living in 
mainland Greece where the Greek revolution eventually broke out knew nothing 
of Ancient Greece and had no notion of what constituted a modern nation state 
(8). Indeed, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire never called themselves Greeks 
(Hellenes) as did the Ancient Greeks, but Christians or Romans, in keeping with 
their Eastern Orthodox tradition that prevailed unaltered for over a thousand 
years in the East Roman or Byzantine Empire. For their cultural identity, 
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therefore, the Greeks of mainland Greece looked steadfastly to the Orthodox 
Church and saw themselves as the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of a Moslem 
Empire. Hence, while Europeans saw the Greek War of Independence as a 
resurgent Ancient Greece reasserting the ideals of Periclean democracy, as St 
Clair explains: 
 
[These ideas] were, in reality, Western European ideas which had been 
taken back to Greece by Europeans and Greeks educated in Europe. The 
classical tradition which lay at the heart of European civilization had been 
brought back to Greece after an absence of many centuries. (2008:14) 
 
And if mainland Greek military leaders were content to go along with the 
philhellenic propaganda from Europe, far from a desire to change their familiar 
eastern system of government, their sole objective was to get rid of the Turks 
and take their place as rulers. Never for a moment did Europeans suspect that 
the overwhelming majority of mainland Greeks, the scions of the Ancient Greek 
exemplars to whom they had vouchsafed such a central role in their vision for an 
ideal Europe, shared essentially the same eastern scale of values as their 
Ottoman overlords (25).4 
Even so, the Modern Greek awakening to an Ancient Greek identity 
played a central role in the development of the national movement that made 
independence possible. During the early decades of the Modern Greek State, 
11 
 
therefore, the new consciousness was in the ascendant and Byzantium was 
downplayed for diverting attention from the national advantage: the possession 
of glorious ancestors (Politis 1998:14). Greek nationalists put their Orthodox-
Byzantine tradition to one side in their eagerness to join European intellectual 
currents that identified modern democracy with Ancient Greece. Many 
westernizing Greek intellectuals and politicians, acutely conscious of the 
universal admiration their ancient heritage evoked in the West, adopted the 
Enlightenment prejudices of their western admirers, which privileged the 
achievements of Ancient Greece and rejected Byzantium as insignificant 
centuries of “priest-ridden obscurantism” (1995:2). Indeed, it was in this spirit, 
in order to showcase the classical monuments of Athens when the capital was 
moved there in 1834, that many irreplaceable Byzantine monuments were 
demolished (Llewellyn Smith 2004:134-5). It is little wonder, therefore, that 
Europe’s imperfect pre-understanding of the Modern Greek culture went 
unchallenged. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, a critical identity 
reassessment took place in Greece. Responding to a profound need in their 
Orthodox sense of self, the Greeks began to replace their borrowed 
Enlightenment-inspired history with a history of continuity, which, while 
diminishing nothing of the glories of Ancient Greece, rehabilitated to its 
deserved place in the Modern Greek culture the glories of the Byzantine 
centuries. The five-volume, History of the Greek Nation, by Constantine 
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Paparrigopoulos, (1815-91), which appeared in its definitive edition in 1887, re-
established in the Greek ethos the central role played by Orthodoxy and 
Byzantium. Moreover, the History was instrumental in articulating for the 
Modern Greek culture an expectant sense of providential destiny: the reconquest 
of Constantinople and the recreation of  a Byzantine “Greek Empire” 
(Kitromilides 1998:28-31). 
For the West, however, complacent in its Enlightenment version of 
history and sealed off in any case by the language barrier (Beaton 2009:6), 
developments in Modern Greek historiography remained as shrouded in 
darkness as the Byzantine and Ottoman centuries. This state of blissful 
ignorance was aided and abetted by the Greeks themselves, who as the 
regenerated Ancients now enjoyed a proprietorial expertise over all things 
Ancient Greek. In their dealings with the West, therefore, instead of shouting 
from the rooftops their reinstated eastern identity they took pains to consolidate 
and reinforce their privileged status as Ancient Greeks through the cultivation of 
Greek exceptionalism. As Roderick Beaton (2009:4) observes, Greece was 
presented, not as just one among many Balkan states that had emerged from the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, but as a special case, “uniquely ancient and 
therefore like no other”. The West was therefore never obliged to fill in the gaps 
created by the elided Byzantine centuries and has continued to labor under this 
imperfect pre-understanding of the Modern Greek culture down to the present 
day. 
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 Separate Development 
In a Business Spectator article on the Eurozone and the Greek financial crisis, 
Alan Kohler (2012) notes that the roots of the problem go back to the fall of the 
Roman Empire in 476, which produced a Europe that “no single dynasty ever 
again controlled”. Whatever the vicissitudes of this period in history, however, 
the true significance of Kohler’s pronouncement for the Greek financial crisis 
lies in the history that it leaves out. That is to say, drawing upon the West’s 
imperfect pre-understanding of Modern Greece, Kohler neglects to add that the 
Roman Empire did not fall in 476 but continued for another thousand years with 
its capital at Constantinople. Such western “forgetfulness” (the elided Byzantine 
centuries) is often attributed to Edward Gibbon, 1737-1794, author of History of 
the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, who, in step with the Enlightenment 
sensibilities of his times, dismissed the East Roman or Byzantine Empire as the 
triumph of barbarism and Christianity and the betrayal of all that was best in 
Ancient Greece and Rome (Norwich 1989:25-6). This western historical 
blindspot—Europe’s unnoticed historical prejudice—is mainly to blame for why 
European leaders managed so comprehensively to misread the Modern Greek 
culture. 
The blindspot emerges most conspicuously in European nineteenth-
century nation building. Western European states seeking to forge a cultural 
identity turned naturally to the European Middle Ages for the origins of their 
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national past (Politis 1998:13). Moreover, as indicated earlier, liberal European 
leaders held up the model of Classical Greece for their vision of an ideal Europe, 
hence Greece’s branding value was a must for the European project. However, 
as the Greek medieval past was a blank for Western Europeans, in order to 
invite Greece into the fold it was necessary for the Greeks to move forward 
Ancient Greece as their national identity and to delete from their culture the 
intervening two thousand years. Such a demand not only encumbered the 
emergent Modern Greek nation with an impossible act to follow, it also ignored 
the greater part of the experience that produced the Modern Greek culture. This 
lacuna in the western collective memory traces back to the fall of the Roman 
Empire in the West, from which point the Orthodox East and the Latin West 
evolved quite separate cultural traditions. 
 The Christian world was once united in one Ecumenical Church within 
the administrative boundaries of the Roman Empire. With the fall of the western 
empire, however, the West began developing in a different direction from its co-
religionists in the East. In the year 800 Charlemagne established a rival empire 
in the West, while in 1095 the Pope proclaimed the First Crusade to the Holy 
Land. The fourteenth century saw the cultural flowering of the Renaissance, 
while the fifteenth century witnessed the voyages of discovery to the New 
World. The sixteenth century brought the cultural upheavals of the Reformation, 
after which came the Scientific Revolution, Rationalism, the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution, bringing in their train the ideals of democracy, the rights 
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of the individual and the concept of the modern nation state. Technological 
advances produced the Industrial Revolution, which led in turn to twentieth 
century modernization, secularization and social and economic reform. These 
events together comprise the Western Tradition, the shared experience that 
produced the values, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations upon which the 
modern western market economies rest. 
None of these events took place in the Orthodox East. While the European 
West was experiencing centuries of continual cultural upheaval, the Orthodox 
East to a large extent remained only a spectator to these changes. That is to say, 
when the Eastern Orthodox Greeks reappeared on the European stage in 1821, 
they had not shared the experience of the Western Tradition. It was not possible, 
therefore, for the Greeks to possess the western values that European idealism 
was projecting upon them. 
This is not to say that the Greeks knew nothing of the Latin West and 
looked on with indifference as the centuries passed. On the contrary, after the 
Byzantine Empire went into decline after the eleventh century, the Orthodox 
East experienced a long series of reversals, all of which it blames squarely on 
the treachery of the West.5 For example, for the Orthodox East, the Great 
Schism of 1054, which split the church permanently into Orthodox and Latin 
camps, was the result of Latin insistence on Papal supremacy and the addition to 
the Nicene Creed of the filioque.6 Then came the betrayal of 1204, when the 
Venetians diverted the Fourth Crusade from its original objective in the Holy 
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Land to sack the Christian capital of Constantinople and impiously place a 
western usurper on the Byzantine throne. In 1453, after the Orthodox Christians 
had pleaded despairingly for western military assistance against the impending 
Ottoman threat, the West again invoked the questions of Papal supremacy and 
the filioque and looked on as the Byzantine Empire fell to the Turks and the 
Greeks descended into 400 years of subjugation under the Ottoman yoke.  
Continuing into the modern era, with the establishment of the Modern 
Greek state in 1832, to appease the Ottoman Porte the western powers 
intentionally left three quarters of the Greek population outside the borders, thus 
condemning the fledgling state to a series of ruinous irredentist campaigns. In 
1922, after Greece had received a mandate to prosecute its claims in Anatolia, it 
was again abandoned by the West and the resulting exchange of populations 
terminated a 2500-year Greek presence on the western littoral of Asia Minor. 
During the Second World War Greece endured a brutal four-year German 
occupation, only to be plunged into a fratricidal civil war when western powers 
excluded the Communist resistance from the post-war government, thus 
preventing the country from modernizing along with the rest of Europe. In 1967, 
after suspected western intriguing, a crude military dictatorship took power in 
Greece, provoking the unauthorized Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus 
which remains in place to this day.7 The West also closed ranks against Greece 
over the Macedonian question when Greek territorial integrity was threatened 
after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 
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The vast majority of westerners stand uncomprehending in the face of 
these charges. For the Greeks, however, the long list of betrayals fuels the 
Modern Greek sense of entitlement, the feeling of justified indignation produced 
by centuries of perceived western duplicity—the conviction that “they owe us” 
(Manolopoulos 2011:62). 
 
The Ottoman Period 
The most immediate influence on the Modern Greek culture before 
independence was the four centuries of Ottoman rule that followed the fall of 
Constantinople. Ottoman rule, which forbade non-Muslims to testify against 
Muslims, gave rise to an authoritarian and capricious overseeing class whose 
leadership style produced the corresponding leadership expectations in the 
Greek subordinate class. This meant that while the Greeks learned to respect a 
harsh and authoritarian leadership style, overseer capriciousness also gave scope 
to subordinate opportunism. For as their Turkish overlords stood outside the 
Greek extended family or ingroup, any leadership lapse could be seized upon by 
the Greeks as fair game to be exploited for ingroup advantage.8  Clogg writes 
that: 
 
The capriciousness of Ottoman rule and the weakness of the idea of the  
rule of law helped to shape the underlying values of Greek society and  
to determine attitudes to the state and to authority that have persisted  
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into the present. (1995:3) 
 
The best defence against social vulnerability was to secure the protection 
of highly placed patrons who could mediate with those in positions of power and 
privilege (patron-client dependencies). Another imperative was to trust no one 
outside one’s own extended family circle or ingroup (exclusive ingroup 
allegiance). That is to say, while Europeans were gaining the shared experience 
of the Western Tradition that would produce the values, beliefs, assumptions, 
and expectations upon which the modern western market economies rest, in the 
Ottoman Empire the Greeks were gaining a shared experience that would 
encourage suspicion of the state, distrust of outsiders, paying for favors, pulling 
strings through powerful connections, and learning how best to exploit an 
authoritarian and capricious leadership style. 
 
Ingroups vs. Outgroups 
The legacy from the Ottoman years of strong ingroup loyalties and a 
corresponding hostility towards outgroups still informs fundamental cultural 
assumptions and expectations in Greece today. Ingroup/outgroup perceptions are 
crucial, for example, in workplace relationships between leaders and 
subordinates. As a general rule, Greece’s many family firms and smaller to 
medium-sized companies are patriarchal in nature and tend to operate as 
extended ingroups. In larger organizations, however, subordinates may regard a 
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distant and impersonal management as part of the outgroup to be deceived and 
outsmarted for the benefit of the ingroup. Even so, as Benjamin Broome 
(1996:63-5) observes, while it is indeed culturally acceptable for Greeks to 
exploit outgroup weakness for ingroup gain, it is also possible for the effective 
manger to establish a personal relationship with subordinates and thus become 
identified with the ingroup, in which case subordinates respond “with 
submissiveness, acceptance and warmth”. The first task of the effective leader in 
Greece, in other words, is to transform the organization into an extended family 
where all members feel part of the inner group (Papalexandris 2007:784). 
Ingroup/outgroup distinctions also play a critical role in determining 
attitudes toward broader social institutions in Greece, where impersonal 
collectives such as the state can be perceived as outgroups to be suspected and 
exploited for ingroup advantage. For example, just as Greeks under Ottoman 
rule resented the arbitrary haratzi or head tax imposed on Christians by the 
Ottoman authorities (Woodhouse 1968:102), so too is there little incentive in 
Greece today to pay taxes to a distrusted outgroup when the money could be 
used to promote ingroup interests (1996:64). And when an inefficient and 
corrupt tax system expends 85% of its revenues on an inflated public sector and 
other wasteful expenses, many Greeks feel they are quite justified in their 
distrust, a lack of civic confidence that perpetuates the endemic tax evasion in 
Greece (Pryce 2012:58-9). Pointing to this lack of a sense of collectivity, 
Michael Lewis (2011:82) writes in exasperation that Greek ingroups feel 
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connected to nothing outside their small worlds, that they behave like “atomized 
particles, each of which has grown accustomed to pursuing its own interest at 
the expense of the common good”. Indeed, this corporate deficiency in the 
Greek society, the absence of a common allegiance to the collective, has been 
identified by analysts as the major stumbling block for Greece in its quest to 
take its place in the European family of nations. Nancy Papalexandris 
(2007:783), writing from the GLOBE project, declares that the development of a 
sense of the collective is essential if Greeks are to become successful Europeans. 
 
Leadership Expectations  
Writing in a context of modern western business culture, Gary Yukl, in 
Leadership in Organizations, gives the following definition of effective 
leadership. 
 
Leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree 
about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of 
facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared 
objectives. (2013:23) 
  
Two key variables Yukl notes in the central leadership task of influencing others 
are (1) leader attributions of followers (the judgments and expectations leaders 
project upon followers) and (2) follower attributions of leaders (the judgments 
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and expectations followers project upon leaders) (2013:27).9 Leaders construct 
their judgments and expectations of followers based on their perception of 
follower behavior and performance, while followers construct their judgments 
and expectations of leaders based on their perception of leader success or failure 
(225-233).  
For effective leaders an awareness of attribution variation is essential, for 
not only does it allow leaders to validate the judgments and expectations that 
they have constructed for their followers, it also exposes any unnoticed 
judgments and expectations that their followers may have constructed for them. 
If leaders are to effectively influence their followers, in other words, they must 
first “fill in the gaps” in their knowledge about their followers. Understanding 
requires pre-understanding. This principle naturally assumes an even greater 
importance when leaders and followers come from distinctly different cultures, 
where values, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations can diverge markedly. 
Yukl writes that: 
 
Leaders are increasingly confronted with the need to influence people 
from other cultures, and successful influence requires a good 
understanding of these cultures. Leaders must also be able to understand 
how people from different cultures view them and interpret their actions. 
(2013:348) 
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European leaders have never consistently applied this fundamental 
leadership principle in their interactions with their Greek followers. By basing 
their attributions of the Greeks upon their pre-understanding of their western 
followers—by assuming the Greeks to be western like themselves—European 
leaders not only construct unfounded judgments and expectations for their Greek 
followers, they also fail to notice judgments and expectations that their Greek 
followers construct for them. Deceived thus by invalid judgments and 
expectations from both sides, European leaders are unable to influence their 
Greek followers “to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how 
to do it”. 
If a study of the Modern Greek leadership style had been commissioned 
by EEC leaders, it would have revealed that ingroups and outgroups are of 
paramount importance. Ingroups include family, relatives, close friends and 
trusted associates and there is a strong sense of loyalty, cooperation and trust 
between ingroup members. Outgroups, in contrast, are viewed with hostility and 
mistrust and outgroups exhibiting leadership designs are perceived in a master-
slave relationship to be outsmarted and exploited for ingroup advantage 
(2007:783). Moreover, outsiders are unlikely to be placed in positions of trust or 
authority, while insiders enjoy special favor (1996:67-83). The first step in any 
proposed partnership with Greeks, in other words, is to become part of the 
ingroup. 
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 The study would also have revealed that the most important aspect of 
workplace interactions in Greece is the personal relationship. Due to the 
dominance of the family and ingroup loyalties, the Greek leadership style is 
patriarchal and leaders are seen as the head of a family or extended ingroup. 
Effective leaders therefore devote the necessary time to develop a personal 
relationship with their subordinates and to become sensitive to their individual 
needs. An inseparable component of Greek relationships moreover is the 
concept of philotimo, a cultural construct involving a sense of personal honor 
and self-esteem that has no direct equivalent in the West. Broome writes: 
 
The Greek philotimo is easily bruised, and there is constant emphasis on 
both protecting and enhancing philotimo. Protecting it leads to a concern 
with losing face, with shielding the inner core of the self from ridicule, 
and with avoiding actions that would cause loss of respect. (1996:66-7) 
 
The loss of face incurred by an injury to the philotimo can do irreparable 
damage to a personal relationship and may result in permanently driving away 
the injured party. Indeed, anthropologist Dorothy Lee states that without a 
knowledge of philotimo it is not possible to have a satisfactory relationship with 
Greeks (in 1996:67). 
 If European leaders had determined Greek attribution variation before 
negotiating cross-cultural membership agreements with Greece—if they had 
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filled in the gaps in their pre-understanding to allow understanding—they would 
have known about Greek leadership expectations and established a personal 
relationship to achieve ingroup status. Leadership expectations from both sides 
would have been valid from the beginning and the Greek financial crisis would 
have been avoided. 
 
Leadership Mistake 1: EEC Leaders Admit Greece Prematurely to the 
EEC 
During a 1980 debate in the British parliament over Greek membership to the 
EEC, the Foreign Minister declared that Greece’s entry would be a “fitting 
repayment by the Europe of today for the cultural and political debt that we all 
owe to a Greek heritage over 3000 years old” (1995:2). European leaders, in 
other words, had not filled in the gaps of their imperfect 1821 pre-understanding 
of the Modern Greek culture. Greece was still identified with Ancient Greece, 
and as the “cradle of democracy” Greece’s branding value for the European 
project of a “United States of Europe” was more indispensable now than ever. 
This became evident when EEC leaders approved Greece’s early entry to the 
EEC in 1981. 
 The preliminaries go back to 1961 when Greece signed an Association 
Agreement with the EEC. Effective from 1962, the agreement provided for a 
twenty-two year transition period during which Greece, with financial and 
technical support from the EEC, would be brought more into line socially and 
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economically with the nine Community states. However, unwilling to lend 
legitimacy to the military dictatorship that took power in Greece in 1967, the 
EEC suspended the program after barely five years of operation. With the 
restoration of democracy in 1974, therefore, when the returning Prime Minister 
Constantine Karamanlis pushed for a speeding up of the transition process, the 
program still had seventeen years to run.  
 With Karamanlis staking his own personal reputation on the venture, in 
1975 Greece formally applied for “as full and as rapid accession as possible” to 
the EEC (CVCE 2012:3). Following standard EEC practice, the European 
Council requested a report from the European Commission assessing Greece’s 
candidature. Not surprisingly, in view of Greece’s suspended transition program, 
the Commission had serious reservations over Greece’s readiness and 
recommended a new 7-8 year pre-accession period. According to the 
Commission's report, Greece’s backward economy was incompatible with an 
internal market designed for developed economies and ill-equipped to absorb  
the huge injections of aid money designated for Greece (CVCE 2012:3). The 
European Commission, it seems, wisely anticipated the dangers of sending new 
consignments of English gold to Greece. 
The Commission was not alone in its reservations. Francois Mitterrand, 
the leading opposition politician in France, publicly echoed the concerns of the 
nine member states when he declared that the early accession of Greece was in 
the interests of neither Greece nor the Community and that interim steps were 
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desirable (ESI 2006:2). Even so, in spite of EEC member-state resistance and in 
the face of overwhelming expert advice, the European Council overruled the 
Commission’s report and approved the Greek application. Why did European 
leaders single out Greece for preferential treatment?  
For Karamanlis, the dramatic return of democracy to its ancient birthplace 
happily coincided with an ideological shift within the EEC leadership. 
Encouraged by the fall of three dictatorships (Portugal, Spain and Greece), EEC 
leaders undertook to extend the Community’s original charter of preserving 
peace and stability in Europe to include the preservation of democracy. That is 
to say, from what had been an essentially economic presence in the 
Mediterranean, the EEC began to place increased importance on its political role 
(Karamouzi 2013:20). Sensing this shift, Karamanlis pressed for early EEC 
accession, basing his campaign, not upon economic grounds, which meant 
certain failure, but upon the political and moral grounds of preserving 
democracy in the country that EEC leaders liked to hail as the “fount of 
European civilization” (1995:177). 
Perceiving the Commission's report as a personal rebuke, Karamanlis 
instantly summoned the ambassadors of the nine member states to a meeting in 
Athens where he condemned the report out of hand as “morally and politically 
unacceptable to Greece” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2010:159). Skillfully 
exploiting the “cradle of democracy” stratagem, in a rhetorical approach 
described by Eirini Karamouzi (2013:22) as “moral entrapment”, Karamanlis 
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“shamed” EEC leaders into honoring their alleged moral obligations to Greece. 
By reminding EEC leaders of their debt to Ancient Greece and by capitalizing 
upon the EEC’s new role as the defender of democracy, Karamanlis shifted EEC 
entry criteria from economic compatibility to political vulnerability and the issue 
of Greece’s backward economy was conveniently dropped.10  
Thanks to Karamanlis, Greece received fast-track entry into an elite 
financial circle without lifting a finger to change its backward economy. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, just as in 1824, the greater part of the huge volume of 
hard currency that streamed into Greece did not find its intended target. As 
Jason Manolopoulos (2011:8) observes, Andreas Papandreou, whose PASOK 
socialist party came to power in October 1981, instead of modernizing the 
economy, awarded favors to trade unions and other interests groups and 
dispensed patronage to party supporters through political appointments to the 
civil service on a vast scale. Manolopoulos writes that “in Greece, the 1980’s 
saw the birth of a ruinously wasteful and corrupt public sector” (8). 
Western commentators invariably blame the Greeks themselves for the 
economic mismanagement of the 1980s, the period now regarded as laying the 
preconditions for the 2009 financial crisis. However, this judgment fails to take 
into account the leader-follower relationship between the EEC leadership and 
the Greeks on the run-up to accession. The Greeks were the candidates making 
submission to join an elite association and as the aspirant party they looked to 
the EEC leaders for instruction. On the issue of EEC accession, in other words, 
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the EEC leaders were the ones calling the shots, not the Greeks. The Greeks, for 
their part, instinctively operating with the opportunistic expectations instilled by 
four hundred years of Ottoman rule, perceived the smiling participative EEC 
leadership style as outgroup weakness and felt justified in exploiting it for all it 
was worth. Hence, Karamanlis without compunction played the Greek 
exceptionalism card to jump the queue and achieve ingroup advantage at the 
expense of outgroup interests, while Papandreou combined party clientism with 
the “they owe us” factor to divert EEC funds to reward individuals and social 
groups that had brought him to power (78). Laboring under their unnoticed 
historical prejudice toward the Modern Greek culture, EEC leaders allowed the 
Greeks to lead them around by the nose. 
 The point is that if EEC leaders had removed their rose-colored glasses 
(if they had filled in the gaps of their imperfect pre-understanding to allow 
understanding) they would have impatiently dismissed Karamanlis’s overtures 
and expressly prohibited Papandreou from administering any EEC aid money. 
They would have behaved like the responsible CEO of any international 
organization and rejected Greece’s application as premature and instructed the 
Greeks to complete the necessary pre-accession period. In short, if EEC leaders 
had refrained from indulging Greece with preferential treatment on the basis of 
its Ancient Greek heritage, the Greeks would not have been able to lay the basis 
for their financial crisis and their economy and their national honor would have 
remained intact. 
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 Leadership Mistake 2: EU Leaders Admit Greece Prematurely to the 
Eurozone 
After securing early membership to the EEC, the Greeks made little attempt to 
implement a coherent plan of social and economic reform to modernize their 
economy. As noted earlier, they adjusted their eastern clientist system to suit the 
new conditions and adopted what might be described as a laissez-faire approach 
to modernization. That is to say, it was expected that EEC membership in itself 
would mysteriously draw the Greek economy up to the level of the economies of 
the other member states.11 Not surprisingly, therefore, in 1999, when EU 
member states were assessed for economic convergence as a prerequisite for 
Eurozone entry, no significant improvement had been made to the backward 
Greek economy and the Greek application was accordingly rejected. 
Nevertheless, two years later, EU leaders reviewed Greece’s application and 
judged the Greek economy to have met convergence criteria. Why did EU 
leaders give Greece a second chance? And how did the Greeks modernize their 
backward economy in just two short years when they had manifestly failed to do 
so over the preceding forty years? 
If we take a closer look at Greece’s Eurozone application, unlike other 
more circumspect member states, Greece was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
single currency from the outset and hastened to submit a five-year plan to the 
European Commission outlining how it would comply with the convergence 
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criteria.12 That is to say, in step with their “laissez-faire” thinking, the Greeks 
saw Eurozone membership as a one-off opportunity to transform their country at 
a single stroke into a rich, advanced, western economy. But while Greek 
governments demonstrated a flair for bringing key percentages closer to 
convergence requirements, there was little evidence of the slow and steady 
progress in the real economy that would enable Greece to compete effectively 
with the cutting-edge economies to the north. Moreover, the dominant factor in 
the run-up to convergence was the huge expansion of the public sector. So by 
the time 1999 came around, Greece was still a backward economy dependent on 
agriculture, tourism, shipping and a few basic industries, but most of all on the 
massive spending of a burgeoning public sector. Hence, when the Greek 
economy came up for assessment, as Matthew Lynn (2011:47-8) observes, “it 
didn’t just fail by a little, it failed by a mile”. 
But then, just as in Karamanlis’s campaign to speed up Greek EEC 
accession, European idealism stepped in to overturn the decision. For the 
Greeks, who had staked their future on Eurozone membership, their exclusion 
was a crushing blow and they immediately appealed to EU leaders for an 
assessment extension. And despite the proven unfitness of the Greek economy, 
EU leaders granted the Greeks their request. For, more than a practical economic 
exercise, for EU leaders the single currency was a vehicle for promoting their 
ideal for a United States of Europe. Lynn writes: 
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The euro had never really been designed as an instrument of economic 
policy. It was, first and foremost, a political currency. It was a way of 
pushing the states of Europe toward closer integration, of centralizing 
power, and of turning the separate national economies into a single bloc. 
It was a grand idealistic project. (2011:50) 
 
For Europe to achieve the greatest possible political integration, the Eurozone 
needed to include the greatest possible number of member states. Seduced 
therefore by the prospect of advancing their European ideal, EU leaders gave the 
Greeks the tacit go-ahead to comply with Eurozone convergence requirements 
using whatever means necessary, and unsuspectingly they played straight to the 
heart of the Greek entitlement culture. 
It is now well known that with the help of Goldman Sachs Greece 
falsified its convergence figures to meet Eurozone entry requirements (Lewis 
2011:60-3). But in a context of Greek leadership expectations, the EU leadership 
had winked its encouragement and the Greeks had provided the convergence 
figures as agreed. That is to say, contrary to the howls of an outraged European 
media, it was not the Greeks who connived to secure back-door Eurozone entry 
for Greece, but an unwitting EU leadership. An effective leadership, in sharp 
contrast, would have known about the Greek entitlement culture and under no 
circumstances would have allowed a backward Greek economy into the 
fledgling European single currency. It would have brushed aside earnest Greek 
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pleading and debarred the Greeks from Eurozone membership until they had 
dropped their opportunist laissez-faire thinking and demonstrated genuine 
economic convergence. If EU leaders had determined follower attribution 
variation—if they had filled in the gaps of their pre-understanding to allow 
understanding—not only would the Greek financial crisis have been avoided 
with all the attendant benefits, but the Greeks would also be many valuable 
years down the road toward the essential economic and social reform that will 
allow them to become successful Europeans. By expecting the Greeks to 
respond like their western followers, EU leaders did Greece a monumental 
disservice. 
When the magnitude of the Greek debt became known and the gravity of 
the crisis had finally registered, EU leaders did little to examine their own role 
in the affair. As they watched the Greeks topple from their impossible pedestal 
of classical perfection, EU leaders continued unwaveringly to see Greece as a 
western culture and they blamed the entire debacle on the insubordination of 
their disgraced improvident followers. No attempt was made to manage the 
crisis by establishing a personal relationship and becoming the respected and 
trusted patriarchal leaders of a Greek ingroup.13 EU leaders, on the contrary, 
confirmed their outsider status by imposing a punitive regimen of economic 
discipline, through which they proceeded publicly and energetically to trample 
upon the Greek philotimo. For the Greeks, the West had abandoned them yet 
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again, and the Greek financial crisis became just one more injury to add to the 
list of western treacheries. 
This is not to suggest that the Greeks are without fault in the events that 
led to the Greek financial crisis. The financial excesses committed by the Greeks 
as members of the EEC/EU and the even greater excesses as members of the 
Eurozone have been widely documented and need not be enumerated again here. 
But without accession to the EEC and the Eurozone, two decisions for which the 
EEC/EU leadership must accept full responsibility, the Greeks could not have 
committed those excesses. Leaders have a duty to “fill in the gaps” in their 
knowledge about their followers. Understanding requires pre-understanding. 
The locus of accountability for the Greek financial crisis, therefore, lies with 
European leadership.     
 
Conclusion 
As regards the broader theoretical aim of this study, we may conclude that an 
historical examination of the Greek financial crisis foregrounds an unnoticed 
historical prejudice that hinders understanding and leads to misunderstanding. 
Even so, Intercultural Communication can naturally do no more than attempt to 
provoke an awareness of an unnoticed prejudice. There exists no formal channel 
through which a complacent Europe can be compelled to suspend the validity of 
its prejudice toward Greece and to adjust expectations to reflect more unified 
understanding. But of one thing we may be certain. So long as Europe harbors 
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its unnoticed prejudice, it will not consider it a judgment. And, unable to put 
perceived information into a meaningful context, EU leaders will continue 
unknowingly to administer their lethal doses of austerity as a cure for the Greek 
financial crisis and in so doing they risk succeeding, unwittingly, in driving 
Greece away from taking its rightful place in the European family of nations. 
 
Epilogue 
As a member of the Eurozone in 2001, with access to international money 
markets Greece was able to borrow without restriction on essentially the same 
terms as an industrial giant such as Germany. Cashed-up financiers looking for a 
safe haven to place their accumulated capital saw Greek securities as not only 
government guaranteed but also EU guaranteed. It was as if 1824 had returned 
and ships laden with consignments of English gold began arriving again in 
Greece. Only this time the ships arrived not in ones and twos but in armadas. 
However, when creditors realized that their money was not guaranteed after all, 
Greece was immediately banned from international money markets and punitive 
austerity measures were imposed that have seriously retarded the prospects of 
economic recovery for decades to come. Europe, it seems, has moved no closer 
to an understanding of the Modern Greek culture since its first romanticizing 
encounters with the Greeks in 1821. 
 
Notes
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1 Hans-Georg Gadamer  (2004: 217) writes: “What we call experience and 
acquire through experience is a living historical process; and its paradigm is not 
the discovery of facts but the peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a 
whole.” 
2 The association of the label “Greece” with Ancient Greece has proved so 
tenacious in the western mind that the prefix “Modern” has been necessary in 
certain contexts to designate the modern culture. See Beaton (2009:4). 
3 For example, Greek merchant traders and members of the educated Phanariot 
class, the Greeks from the Greek diaspora in Europe and from the Ionian islands 
(which remained largely free from Ottoman rule), and those Greeks who had 
been sent to study in Europe. 
4 Count Ioannis Capodistrias, the western-oriented first President of Greece, 
described the leaders of mainland Greece as “Christian Turks”. See Clogg 
(1995:46).   
5 In the dying days of the Byzantine Empire, Eastern Orthodox hatred of the 
Latin West was so intense that the Grand Duke Lukas Notaras declared that “he 
would rather that the turban of the Turk prevailed in the ‘City’ (Constantinople) 
than the mitre of the Catholic prelate” (1995:7).    
6 The West inserted the extra phrase “and from the Son”; in Latin, filioque. 
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7 Clogg (1995:165) notes that there is no evidence for western (US) involvement 
in the coup. Nevertheless, as Eirini Karamouzi (2013:19) observes, “the 
majority of Greeks remained wedded to this idea”. 
8 In the Greek shadow theatre tradition under Ottoman rule, the Turkish Vizier is 
often outsmarted by his Greek subordinate, the protagonist Karagiozis. See 
Myrsiades and Myrsiades (1999:26).    
9 Yukl defines “follower” as one who acknowledges the focal leader as the 
primary source of guidance. Unlike the term “subordinate”, which assumes a 
more formal authority relationship, the term “follower” does not preclude 
leadership processes that can occur even in the absence of a formal authority 
relationship (2013:24).  
10 At the end of the negotiations, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
remarked that “it was impossible to exclude Greece, the mother of all 
democracies, from Europe”. Later Giscard admitted that it was a mistake to 
support Greece’s early entry to the EEC (Karamouzi 2013:19-23).     
11 Kitromilides (1998:31) notes a deeply ingrained expectation in the Modern 
Greek culture of Greece proceeding providentially towards a propitious telos. 
Theodore George Tatsios (1984:106-115) refers to a similar deus ex machina 
thinking that dogged Greek irredentist ambitions from the late nineteenth 
century. James Pettifer (2013:70-100), meanwhile, connects this sanguine 
cultural expectancy with the “hopeless over-optimism” of Greek expectations 
for membership of the EU and the Eurozone. 
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12 Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom chose to remain outside the 
Eurozone.  
13 Vicky Pryce (2012:208) provides a revealing insight into the Greek patriarchal 
leadership style. Referring to the austerity program imposed on Greece in the 
wake of the financial crisis, Pryce writes: “The therapy employed to cure Greece 
hasn’t worked and will not work for as long as the focus lies on securing loan 
repayments. Like dealing with a naughty child, spoiled by its elders, punishment 
alone is not the recommended remedy. Coaching and encouragement work 
better. Write off the broken china and show the children how to set the table 
properly. Then join them for dinner.” 
References 
Allwood, J.  (1985). Intercultural communication. English translation of 
Tvärkulturell kommunikation. In Allwood, J. (Ed.) Tvärkulturell kommunikation, 
Papers in Anthropological Linguistics 12. (1-25). 
http://immi.se/eiw/texts/Intercultural_Communication_-_Jens_Allwood.pdf 
Beaton, R. (2009). Introduction. In R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.),  The making of 
Modern Greece: Nationalism, romanticism and the uses of the past (1797-1896). 
(1-18). Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Broome, B. (1996). Exploring the Greek mosaic: A guide to intercultural 
communication in Greece. Yarmouth: Intercultural Press, Inc. 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Clogg, R. (1995). A concise history of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
CVCE (Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe). (2012). The accession 
of Greece. Retrieved from: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_accession_of_greece-en-
61a2a7a5-39a9-4b06-91f8-69ae77b41515.html 
Dahl, Ø. (2004). The dynamics of communication. In The intercultural 
perspective in a multicultural world. (27-45). 
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/134955/145e.pdf?sequence
=1 
ESI (European Stability Initiative) Part 1. (2006). The Dutch debate on Turkish 
accession. In Beyond enlargement fatigue? Retrieved from: 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_74.pdf 
Gadamer, H. (2004). Truth and method. London: Continuum. 
Holden, D. (1972). Greece without columns. London: Faber and Faber. 
Karamouzi, E. (2013). The Greek paradox. In LSE Ideas: The crisis of 
enlargement (19-25). Retrieved from: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR018.aspx 
Kohler, A. (2012). No Greek blessing on Europe’s unholy union. In Business 
Spectator 2012, June 18. Retrieved from: 
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2012/6/18/resources-and-
energy/no-greek-blessing-europes-unholy-union 
39 
 
Koliopoulos, J. S. & Veremis, T. M. (2010). Modern Greece: A history since 
1821. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Kitromilides, P. (1998). On the intellectual content of Greek nationalism: 
Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea. In D. Ricks and P. Magdalino 
(Eds.), Byzantium and the Modern Greek identity. (25-33). Hampshire: Ashgate.   
Lewis, M. (2011). Boomerang: The meltdown tour. London: Allen Lane. 
Llewellyn Smith, M. (2004). Athens: A cultural and literary history Oxford: 
Signal Books. 
Lynn, M. (2011). Bust: Greece, the euro, and the sovereign debt crisis. New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Manolopoulos, J. (2011). Greece’s odious debt: The looting of the Hellenic 
Republic by the euro, the political elite and the investment community. London: 
Anthem Press. 
Myrsiades, K & Myrsiades, L. Trans. (1999). Karagiozis. New York: Pella 
Publishing. 
Norwich, J. J. (1989). Byzantium: The early centuries. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Papalexandris, N. (2007). Greece: From ancient myths to modern realities. In J. 
S. Chhokar, F. C. Brodbeck & R. J. House (Eds.), Culture and leadership across 
the world: The GLOBE book of in-depth studies of 25 societies. (767-802). 
London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Pettifer, J. (2013). The making of the Greek crisis.  eBook. 
40 
 
Politis, A. (1998). From Christian Roman emperors to the glorious Greek 
ancestors. In D. Ricks & P. Magdalino (Eds.), Byzantium and the Modern Greek 
identity, (1-14). Hampshire: Ashgate.   
Pryce, V. (2012). Greekonomics: The euro crisis and why politicians don’t get 
it. London: Biteback Publishing Ltd. 
St Clair, W. (2008). That Greece might still be free: The Philhellenes in the War 
of Independence. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. 
Tatsios, T. G. (1984). The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish war of 1897: The 
impact of the Cretan problem on Greek irredentism 1866-1897. New York: East 
European Monographs. 
Woodhouse, C.M. (1968). Modern Greece: A short history. London: Faber and 
Faber. 
Yukl, Gary. (2013). Leadership in organizations. Harlow: Pearson. 
 
 
 
41 
 
